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Abstract 
The financialization of capitalist economies is closely related to the creation and 
commercialization of debt and its derivatives. This article analyses the relationship 
between the financialization of the government debt market and debt sustainability in 
Spain between 1996 and 2013. The article shows how the financialization of the Spanish 
government debt markets has been designed to favour liquidity through debt policy 
innovations, but on the other hand, it allowed investors to take speculative positions on 
the market’s perception of default risk. The quick growth of public over indebtedness to 
finance the government’s deficit and the costs of the financial system aid, produced a 
lack of credibility for Spanish debt sustainability and the government’s solvency. I will 
show that the institutional mechanisms that allowed to transform the banking crisis into a 
sovereign debt crises lie on the micro structure of government debt markets and its degree 
of financialization.  
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Introduction 
Financial markets have reached unprecedented importance in the world's economy; they 
are key to globalization and contemporary capitalism (Bell, 1976).  
Financialization is the concept used to define the increasingly significant role played by 
financial systems in contemporary societies. It is understood here as a profit growth 
strategy developed by financial corporations from the 1970’s onwards in the core 
capitalist economies. This strategy drives and is driven by complex changing processes 
such as deregulation, globalization and financial innovation (Engelen, 2008).  At the 
centre of this strategy is the management of risk, a central tool of the financial industry, 
and an essential instrument to generate business opportunities. For operational purposes, 
financialization will be defined following Hardie’s approach ‘as the ability to trade risk; 
both taking and trading the risk on the performance of an asset’ (2011:143). The breadth 
and depth of financialization depends on the characteristics of national market structures, 
the financial instruments traded in that market, and the type of investors that participate 
in it.  
The article analyses the inter-relationships between the government debt market’s 
degree of financialization, the indebtedness of socio-economic agents and the 
sustainability of public and private debt. It shows how debt sustainability has to do more 
with institutional factors linked to the structure of the government’s national debt market  
and regulations than to the debt to GDP ratio itself.  Government debt market structure 
can enable investors to take and trade sovereign risk in order to increase the demand for 
sovereign bonds and provide liquidity. But at same time these market mechanisms make 
sovereign debt crisis more possible. In the case of Spain, the banking crisis, together with 
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a set of internal structural imbalances affecting the components of public deficit and 
external debt, can explain the progressive rise of public debt since 2008. However, these 
alone cannot explain the worsening of the borrowing conditions imposed by markets 
later, between 2011 and 2012. The main question being addressed is the extent to which 
the government debt market’s degree of financialization may prompt the formation of 
speculative bubbles, causing a vicious circle by which the mere fear of non-sustainability 
makes non-sustainability more likely, because of worsening government debt borrowing 
conditions. The conclusion is that the higher the level of government debt market 
financialization, the higher the possibility of generating situations of sovereign debt crisis 
marked by a government’s difficulty to borrow on a sustainable basis.  This conclusion is 
consistent with Hardie’s (2011) analysis in relation to emerging markets. In analysing the 
evolution of public and private indebtedness and the financialization of the government 
debt market’s micro structure, following Aalbers (2008), the different strands in 
financialization literature are connected (see Krippner, 2005) by arguing that a 
government’s demand for liquidity in government debt markets and the process of 
financial innovation are intrinsically linked.   
This article examines these interconnections in the case of Spain, where the 
banking model is highly dependent on real estate and credit. These characteristics, 
together with the rapid growth of government debt markets, make Spain a special case 
deserving attention in its own right, particularly as it stands outside the experience of 
Anglo-American capitalism.  
The remainder of this paper is organized into three sections. A theoretical 
discussion on financialization and debt sustainability is presented in the first and second 
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sections. A specific analysis of the Spanish case is introduced in the third section in order 
to understand the central trends of the Spanish growth model. An analysis of the degree 
of financialization in the structure of Spanish debt is undertaken and then followed by an 
analysis of the evolution of public and private indebtedness. The paper concludes by 
highlighting the relationships between indebtedness and financialization. 
 Financialization and the valuation of assets  
This section examines definitions and debates surrounding financialization and liquidity. 
Financialization 
Since the end of the 1990s, there has been much discussion of the notion of 
financialization, particularly in the fields of sociology and economics. The term has even 
gone beyond academic spheres and been incorporated with a certain naturalness into 
popular discourse about the crisis.  The multiple approaches used to define the term 
financialization highlight the complex character of this concept.  
It is evident that the recent financial crisis has prompted scholarly interest to 
analyze the impact of financial markets on social, political and economic-productive 
spheres. However, according to Engelen (2008), this interest has not always been 
accompanied by sufficient effort to provide adequate conceptualization and measurement 
of the term. As Dore (2008) concludes, ‘financialization is a bit like globalization - a 
convenient word for a bundle of more or less discrete structural changes in the economies 
of the industrialized world’ (:1097). 
More recently, Van der Zwan (2014) and Krippner (2011) have identified three 
approaches to understanding financialization among scholarly contributions. The first 
approach considers financialization as a new regime of accumulation that emerges in 
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response to declining productivity in the late 1960s (Grahl and Teague, 2000; Boyer, 
2000).These scholars have posited a  relationship between the fall of profitability in the 
productive system and the search for new sources of profitability of non- financial firms 
in financial markets.  
The second approach points out the emergence of a new conception of the nature 
of the firm, the so-called share-holder value, by which firms come to be viewed as a 
bundle of assets rather than organisations with productive purposes (Clark and Wójcik, 
2007; Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2010 ).  
A third approach considers the financialization of everyday life, analysing the 
participation of individuals in financial markets and the emergence of new values about 
risk-taking and indebtedness (Martin, 2002; Lapavitsas, 2009).   
These three approaches understand financialization as a structural transformation 
of capitalism (Lapavitsas, 2011), focusing their attention either on the domain of 
everyday practices and values, or on the field of managerial interests and growth 
strategies for non -financial business. However, this raises questions as to how this wide 
variety of different contributions can be integrated to provide an operational 
conceptualization of financialization. This article attempts to identify the common 
elements of these definitions underpinned by an understanding of financialization as a 
profit-growth strategy of financial corporations that begun in the 1970s in the United 
States and the United Kingdom, transforming the structure of capitalist economies. 
According to Krippner (2011), changes in company strategies, market structure and the 
availability of new technologies, have all shaped financialization.  
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This article conceives financial markets as socio-technical combinations 
(MacKenzie, 2009). That is rather than financialization being viewed as an anonymous 
process of change, it encompasses a set of transformations led by agents in the form of 
financial corporations, governments and supranational institutions.  Financial markets, 
experience greater or lesser degrees of financialization depending on the rules and 
structure of markets that enable actors to speculate with risk on the performance of an 
asset (Hardie 2011) 
As a profit growth strategy, financialization can be described both as a process 
and as a product. The notion of financialization, as a process is related to a series of 
changes that began to develop globally in the 1970s. These changes encompass a number 
of new organizational, mathematical and technological developments, which have 
enabled this unprecedented expansion of the financial sector. The following processes 
characterize some of the most recent developments. 
Firstly, financial disintermediation has meant a less significant role for traditional 
financial intermediaries in favour of direct operations in the capital markets. In Spain, 
this process of disintermediation has particularly affected Treasury finance, but it has 
been less effective in non-financial private sector finance, largely due to the superiority of 
the banking system within financial spheres. However, financial expansion is not shaped 
by technology, rather the design of financial markets is politically shaped providing 
benefits for some actors, while simultaneously creating losses for others (Fligstein, 2001; 
McKenzie, 2009). 
Secondly, securitization reflects the way in which markets are politically designed 
to increase profitability. This is one of the most significant innovations in the field of 
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finance and refers mainly to the transformation of credit (mainly mortgages) into 
securities that can be sold or transferred. This disassociates the loan from the issuing 
agent, thus separating itself from the balance sheets of these entities. This process implies 
that the risk of non-payment associated with these instruments is not eliminated, but is 
instead transferred from the issuer to the purchaser of these securities (Ingham, 2008). 
Securitization needs to be understood within the context of intense financial innovation 
since the late 1970s in major financial centres around the world (MacKenzie and Millo, 
2003; Pardo-Guerra, 2012; Weatherall, 2013). 
Thirdly, it is critical to consider the role played by the state and supranational 
institutions that were active agents of this transformation. The deregulation of the 
financial system, the process of removing legal and administrative restrictions in order to 
promote free competition in the market, were basic pre-conditions for the initial 
development of these processes. 
The valuation of assets 
According to Hardie (2011) financialization has to do with a particular configuration of 
financial markets that enable market participants to buy and sell different types of risk in 
substantial quantities. Financialization here refers to market liquidity, understood as the 
degree to which an asset is a fungible, generalized resource. Liquid assets can be sold and 
bought easily and frequently at a price that everyone in the market knows (Carruthers and 
Stinchcombe, 1999). A perfect liquid asset is one that can be turned into purchasing 
capacity over goods and services, that is, into money or other commodities when we are 
considering other types of economic exchange. However, as these authors point out, 
while the definition of liquidity is clear, how liquidity is created is less obvious. Liquidity 
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is associated with the properties of perfectly competitive markets, where buyers and 
sellers meet easily and frequently. But free markets are ideal abstract models. Rather, the 
creation of the conditions for liquidity depends on the structure of markets and 
government regulations (MacKenzie et al., 2012).  
Following Carruthers and Stinchcombe (1999: 353), three basic mechanisms 
underpin the creation of liquidity: first, a continuous auction in which a crowd of buyers 
meet a crowd of sellers; second, market makers who for a small margin, are willing to 
take the risk of transferring large quantities and maintaining a continuous price; third, the 
creation of homogeneous and standard commodities.  
These mechanisms, separately or together, allow buyers and sellers to be ready to 
trade with each other at a price they can quickly agree on, and to know the commodities 
they transact in. For this reason liquidity is ‘an issue in the sociology of knowledge’ (see 
Mackenzie et al, 2012). 
In the case of financial assets, the creation of standard and homogeneous 
commodities is particularly important because the process concerns how heterogeneous 
claims, on future income streams associated with different sorts of assets, get turned into 
homogeneous commodities that buyers and sellers can understand. According to 
Carruthers and Stinchcombe (1999) ‘financial assets concern obligations that extend over 
the time. They involve promises to pay and so their value depends on the credibility of 
the promisor’ (: 355). What makes valuation especially problematic is the management of 
risks associated with present and future payment obligations. An asset value has to do 
with the flow of information between buyers and sellers.  The creation of a consensus 
among market participants about the value of a particular asset is produced through 
 9 
market mechanisms, that depend on elaborate institutional investors, market rules and 
government regulations (Carruthers and Stinchcombe 1999).  At the same time market 
liquidity depends on how primary and secondary markets are interconnected; the capacity 
to transfer a debt from one creditor to another is conditioned by a consensus about 
information that relates to a debtor’s solvency over time. 
 Financialization and liquidity have different characteristics and at the same time 
they are intrinsically linked: a highly financialized market structure involves a market 
design that favours liquidity through debt policy innovations that make the market more 
attractive to foreign investors, while a highly liquid market is one where it is possible to 
sell and buy quickly, but without significantly impacting its price. 
The creation of liquidity therefore enhances financial expansion through risk 
management. The claim that financialization is a function of market structure and 
investor type and behaviour suggests that financialization is connected to the intentional 
and unintentional creation of conditions for liquidity. Likewise, the conditions for 
financialization may prompt the formation of speculative bubbles more easily. In the case 
of government debt markets this involves negative assessments on the country’s future 
solvency. The question of how the market creates a consensus about a country’s solvency 
and credibility is a complex and disputed issue directly linked to the concept of debt 
sustainability, which is explored in the next section. 
Debt sustainability and the ‘impossibility principle’  
This section analyses the theoretical basis of debt sustainability methods used by the 
European Commission (EC) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  Indebtedness is 
considered here as a basic relationship that allows, ultimately, the expansion of financial 
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markets. While the concept of debt involves a complex power relationship between 
creditor-debtor, mediated by institutions that distribute rights and obligations between 
parties (Carruthers, 2005). The concept of indebtedness has to do, more precisely, with 
the debtor’s capacity to repay the creditor. Therefore indebtedness has to be analysed in 
relation to debt sustainability.   
The analysis of debt sustainability is not simply the outcome of a mathematical 
formula. It is more complex than the debt-to–GDP ratio, rather, it is a dynamic factor that 
must take into account other variables in relation to the economic and fiscal structures 
and political institutions (Rodríguez-Diez, 2013). Therefore, despite debt-to-GDP ratio 
being an important factor of sustainability, it is not possible to set a universal threshold of 
debt from which one can say that above that point a particular country’s debt is 
unsustainable. This issue adds a new and difficult challenge, in establishing the method 
used to define which debt ceiling should be set in a particular country. 
Debt sustainability is therefore an ambiguous concept. Following Wyplosz 
(2007):  
Debt sustainability is a vexing issue. Its importance is immediately obvious but it escapes 
any easy definition. This situation is not unheard of in economics; price stability and full 
employment are examples of other crucially important policy objectives that cannot be 
simply defined. Yet, while price stability or full employment can both be measured with a 
reasonable degree of precision, debt sustainability cannot be measured directly (2). 
The methodological procedure used by the European Commission for the EU 
member states is termed the Standardised debt sustainability assessment (DSA); this 
procedure is in line with other international institutions like IMF, ECB, OECD. In this 
section the main premises of the DSA framework will be critically discussed.  
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The impossibility principle (Wyplosz, 2007) refers to the unforeseen nature of 
debt sustainability and therefore the unfeasibility of assessing it with certainty, because it 
is based on guesses about a country’s future solvency and labour and economic policies. 
The IMF’s own definition, on which that of the EU is based on (see European 
Commission, 2014) suggests that a debt is sustainable when a borrower is expected to be 
able to continue servicing it without a large correction to its income and expenditure 
balance. Debt sustainability, thus, reflects a country’s ‘solvency, liquidity and adjustment 
capacity’ (IMF 2013: 147).  
According to the IMF, ‘a government is solvent if the present value of its current 
and future primary expenditure (net of interest) is no greater than the present value of its 
current and future stream of income receipts’ (2013: 147). Therefore solvency requires to 
elaborate judgments about future scenarios that are largely unpredictable. The conditions 
for solvency and therefore sustainability, are linked to future predicted balances, and not 
just the current debt level (Wyplosz, 2007). In addition, it is not only the debt itself that 
must be forecasted, but also other factors such as GDP and exports.  
The condition of liquidity set out by the IMF refers to the government’s capacity 
to rollover its maturing debt obligations in an ‘orderly manner’ (2013: 147), i.e., to repay 
its debt regularly and to design appropriate borrowing strategies to avoid an excessive  
financial burden in the future, whilst avoiding having to turn to extraordinary external 
finance or unbearable internal adjustments. However, in addition, future borrowing costs 
can change and these must also be estimated. According to Roubini (2001) the potentially 
perverse effects that the interest rate may have on government debt needs to be taken into 
consideration. The recent sovereign Spanish debt crisis is a good example of a ‘self-
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fulfilling solvency trap’ whereby investors increased their subjective assessment of the 
probability of default on the Spanish public debt that should have had a lower objective 
default probability, according to its current debt to GDP ratio, that in 2011 was the 
second lowest in the EU, and its deficit, two points lower in the same year when 
compared to 2009 (see table 5). The sovereign spreadi increased accordingly to reflect 
that higher subjective probability (Lapavitsas, 2012).  Therefore the fear of non-
sustainability makes non-sustainability more likely. 
The question of debt sustainability can be applied to either external debt or to the 
public debt. Following Wyplosz (2007) the process of analysis is identical, once it is 
noted that the external debt is linked to developments in the primary current account 
balance just, in the same way as the public one is to the primary budget balance. From an 
economic point of view, the analysis of net external debt sustainability is the fundamental 
tool used by financial markets and rating agencies to measure the risk of lending to a 
specific country. Therefore the ratio of net external debt to GDP is considered to be the 
main cause in explaining the differences between the yield of bonds within the Eurozone. 
Similarly, debt sustainability depends, in turn, on the predictions of GDP growth, the 
interest, and exchange rates as well as inflation.  
In the case of public debt sustainability analysis, the existing procedures lack the 
same limitations when it comes to dealing with the ‘impossibility principle’ that rests on 
the uncertainty inherent in predicting the future (Wyplosz, 2007). Accepting that the 
‘impossibility principle’ involves recognising the importance of credibility when it comes 
to explaining the future evolution of interest rates for government bonds. Therefore, 
because there is no support for the view that added complexity allows for more precise 
 13 
assessments, credibility appears as an important component of DSA that can trigger 
vicious and virtuous circles. 
Evidently, at high debt levels the borrowing needs of governments are also high, 
but its borrowing capacity on a sustainable basis will depend on how much lenders will 
finance, at what cost and what conditions lenders impose. Private lenders ‘will obviously 
lend only when the debt will be repaid’ (Hardie 2011: 142), but what are the implications 
if this condition is in the context of a stable fiscal system, a solid democracy and 
membership to the European Union, as in the case of Spain, Ireland, Portugal or even 
Greece. As noted, a high debt is not necessarily unsustainable if markets consider it as 
appropriate, that is, not excessive according to assessments about future solvency, the 
evolution of budget balances, GDP and interest rates. As there is no official procedure to 
determine whether debts are excessive (Wyplozs, 2007: 27), convincing lenders that the 
debt will be repaid is a question of ensuring credibility through policy making.  
At the same time, bringing the debt down when current debt levels are considered 
excessive can be costly in terms of employment and growth, because in the hope of 
reducing borrowing requirements, governments usually adopt macroeconomic policies 
designed to compress demand, reducing public spending, cutting wages and reducing 
taxes. This may have negative effects on employment and economic activity and 
therefore it may worsen the financing conditions imposed by markets to countries with 
debts assessed as excessive. For this reason, a lack of credibility can trigger vicious 
circles and consequently, open the door to speculation on government debt securities.  
 This article is directly concerned with the problem of how a consensus is reached 
about debt sustainability and debtor solvency in Spain.  
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The vicious circle of banking and sovereign risks: the Spanish case  
The Spanish economy has gone through a significant financializationii process in recent 
decades. The main feature of financialization in Spain comes from the huge credit bubble 
created since the late 1990s. The Spanish economic model for the period 1996-2007 was 
originally considered a ‘success’ case by many economists (Royo, 2009): economic 
growth remained above the European average, job creation rates were significant, 
inflation was under control; and all this was compatible with public budget surplus. 
However, underpinning this growth pattern was over-indebtedness. 
Further deregulation of the Spanish financial sector within a single market without 
internal frontiers, where goods, labour and capital circulate freely, has caused an 
unprecedented increase in the expansion of financial capital. The establishment of the 
Euro in 2002, helped to sharpen the fundamental features of the Spanish growth model.  
Low real interest rates in the European periphery, the deregulation of intra-community 
financial movements and the absence of currency risk prompted massive capital flows 
into the Spanish economy. Beyond the huge credit bubbles in the real estate and 
construction industries, it was the root cause of the current account deficit problems due 
to, among other factors, tax fraud associated with these sectors, and illegal withdrawal of 
money from the productive and redistributive cycles. 
The severity of the economic crisis in Spain is only comparable with the 
peripheral countries in the Euro zone. Greece, Portugal and Ireland in particular. Between 
2008 and 2014, the cumulative fall in the GDP was 6.4 per cent, but the most 
representative indicators of the crisis were the official employment statistics. In  the same 
period unemployment rate increased by 13.2 per cent, reaching 24.5 per cent in 2014. 
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Although the origin of the crisis in Spain can be found in the financial system, the 
banking bail-out and the economic recession which exacerbated a sovereign debt crisis 
that made the lack of a political union in the Euro zone evident (see Lapavitsas, 2012). In 
2010 the financial sector in Spain went through a major restructuring process in response 
to strategic and administrative errors identified in the pre-crisis period (Rodríguez -
Fernández, 2012). This process affected savings banks in particular, which resulted in a 
reduction from forty-five to just two of these institutions between 2009 and  2014. The 
financial restructuring, which started late, in 2010, has been carried out through mergers 
and acquisitions (Campuzano et al., 2013).  
 Nonetheless, the financing/funding problems encountered by the Spanish 
Government were triggered, fundamentally, by the impact of the worsening of banking 
risk, and not by public over-indebtedness that, in 2011 was among the lowest in Europe 
(see Table 5). The banking crisis, together with a set of structural internal imbalances 
affecting the components of public deficit and external debt, can explain the progressive 
rise of public debt since 2008. However, these alone cannot explain the worsening of the 
borrowing conditions imposed by markets later, between 2011 and 2012, when the 
sovereign spread, measured by the difference between the yield of 10-year Spanish bonds 
and 10-year German bonds, stood at 637 basic points. This raises questions as to the 
nature of the market mechanisms that enabled investors to speculate with different types 
of sovereign risks and how the financialization of markets affected the sustainability of 
debt. These arguments are developed in the following sections. 
 
The financialization of the market for government debt securities  
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Financialization as a business strategy of financial corporations is a function of the actors 
that participate in financial markets (Hardie, 2011).  The financialization of the investor 
can be defined, according to Hardie, as a strategy to trade risk in order to gain 
profitability on the performance of an asset. Similarly, the financialization of government 
debt markets depends on the legal restriction related to borrowing and selling shortiii and 
on the existence of a variety of authorised transactions ensuring liquidity and reducing 
credit risks. 
This definition connects the macro and micro levels that financialization 
encompasses: the central process of technological, regulatory and institutional change 
and investors’ trading strategies. At the same time, this definition highlights the way in 
which different levels of financialization are negatively associated with different levels of 
debt sustainability in contexts of economic and social uncertainty.  
Following Hardie’s (2011) analysis of emerging markets, financialization in Spain 
will be analysed by considering three dimensions: the volume of trading, the importance 
of financial innovations and the structure of government debt. 
The volume of trading   
The volume of trading in government debt securities assumes ‘that there will be more 
trading in markets where that trading is easier’ (Hardie, 2011). This dimension has been 
measured in two ways. First, using the number of executed trades in domestic 
government public debt markets, which comprises of all debt securities (bonds, treasury 
bills and strips) issued by the general governmentiv that have an international securities 
identification number (ISIN).  Second, using the outstanding amounts and transactions of 
government debt securities (bonds, treasury bills and strips), encompassing redemptions 
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and issues of a new debt security and the same security in tranches. 
The size of debt markets in the European Union varies considerably, both in 
absolute and relative terms. Italy has the largest government debt market, standing at 1.7 
trillion Euros in 2013, followed by Germany, France, UK and Spain with an outstanding 
amount of EUR 792 billon (see Table 1). Most European countries, including Greece, 
showed a declining trend in general government borrowing requirements, except Spain 
and Portugal that experienced a sharp increase in public GDP to debt ratio and therefore 
in the issuing of securities.  
Table 1. Outstanding amounts and transactions of debt securities issued by the general government (face 
value) in billions and as a percentage of GDP 
 
Country Total Outstanding 
amounts 
Issuances  Redemptions 
2012 2013 2012 2013 2012 2013 
UK  
 
1,501.6 
76.6 
1,592.9 
79.0 
535.0 
26.2 
471.0 
23.4 
381.4 
18.7 
386.3 
19.2 
Germany 
 
1,665.2 
60.4 
1,638.2 
58.1 
660.8 
24.9 
479.0 
17.0 
591.5 
21.5 
501.2 
17.8 
France 
 
1565.7 
75.0 
1631.1 
77.1 
775.1 
37.1 
757.1 
35.8 
692.6 
33.2 
670.7 
31.7 
Spain 
 
752.4 
69.6 
792.4 
76.8 
252.9 
24.3 
318.1 
30.8 
180.8 
17.3 
251.0 
24.3 
Italy 
 
1,654.4 
102.5 
1,732.8 
107.8 
508.8 
31.5 
496.1 
30.9 
453.8 
28.1 
416.2 
25.9 
The Netherlands 
 
367.1 
56.9 
358.5 
55.1 
216.6 
33.6 
200.9 
30.9 
175.1 
27.1 
200.3 
30.8 
Portugal 
 
123.4 
73.3 
123.1 
72.3 
36.0 
21.4 
40.1 
23.5 
42.2 
25.1 
39.7 
23.3 
Greece 105.0 
54.1 
93.0 
51.0 
172.6 
88.9 
45.6 
25.0 
337.6 
173.9 
59.5 
32.6 
Source: ECB 
Considering the number of executed trades, the size of the Spanish government debt 
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market is significantly high compared to the rest of the European countries, and taking 
into account that available data does not differentiate between the executed trades in 
stock markets and government debt markets in all European countries (see Table 2). 
Similarly the value of executed trades in the Spanish government debt markets is even 
higher than the whole value of executed trades of the German or French stock market. 
According to this data, size and density does seem to indicate the ease with which a 
government debt security can be bought and sold. As a result of an institutional market 
design it has to be combined with other indicators to complete a measure of 
financialization. 
Table 2. Security trading 2014 
 
 Number of executed trades* 
(in thousands of transactions) 
Value of Executed 
trades 
(in millions of euro) 
UK 
London Stock ExchangeLtd 
 
199,761 
 
9,380,296 
Germany 
Deutche Börse AG 
 
119,357 
 
1,393,589 
France 
NYSE Euronext Paris 
 
121,091 
 
1,071,105 
Spain 
Mercados de Deuda Pública en Anotaciones 
 
BME (Spanish Exchange) 
 
576 
 
71,889 
 
6,472,839 
 
8,557,557 
Italy 
MTI Wholesale Market (government bond 
market) 
Borsa Italiana SpA 
 
275 
76,984 
 
1,487,268 
1,487,268 
The Netherlands 
Euronext Amsterdam Cash Market 
 
47,774 
 
61,459 
Portugal 
Euronext Lisbon SA 
MTS Portugal (government bond market) 
 
7,748 
7,000 
 
39,885 
34,153 
Source: ECB 
*Unsecuritised derivatives and repos are not included 
 
Financial innovations 
A set of financial innovations that establish and influence instrument and trading 
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operations create the appropriate market conditions for liquidity and profitability 
opportunities, in order to attract investors. In relation to these types of operations, the key 
feature that differentiates the Spanish market from the rest of the European markets is the 
predominance of double or buy-back transactions (called repos). In these operations 
contracting parties simultaneously agree two single transactions, a buy and a sell, one on 
the spot and the other in the future or both in the future. The buyer in the first transaction 
will be the seller in the second and vice versa. These are firm transactions, with the sale 
and repurchase price previously agreed at a given date. This buy-back arrangement 
entitles the holder of the asset to collect coupon payments on maturity. In 2014, 
according to the Bank of Spain, the volume of repos in the secondary government debt 
market represented 61 per cent of the total transactions. This percentage remained at high 
levels, an average of 85 per cent during the decade prior to the crisis, and has fallen 
sharply since 2011. When considering the structure of transactions, the importance of 
repos reflects the demand for liquidity of government bond investors. 
Related to this, short selling (also known as shorting or going short) can be 
described as the practice of selling assets, usually government securities, that have been 
borrowed from a third party (usually a broker) with the intention of buying identical 
assets back at a later date to return to the lender (Blommestein, 2010). For investors and 
financial economists, shorting provides the market with important benefits, including 
supporting market liquidity, pricing efficiency and enabling a more effective risk 
management (European Commission, 2010). Precisely the latter point provides an 
important tool to hedge the risk of long term exposure in the same security or in a related 
security. Similarly, critical political economists (Partnoy, 2004) points out the role played 
 20 
by these instruments in the 2007 US crisis and the Greek sovereign debt crisis of 2008. 
The amount of short selling can be measured by the size of the sovereign credit 
default swap (CDS) marketv. CDSs are financial instruments that transfer credit risk from 
one party to another. Credit risk arises from the possibility of default on a pre-agreed 
payment, and the purchase of CDS insures against the loss of the pre-agreed payment, 
thereby shifting the risk to the seller of the CDS. An investor may wish to sell a bond or 
buy a CDS when s/he believes that the credit risk will rise. In this way s/he reduces his 
exposure to the credit risk and potentially gains from negative views of evolving credit 
risk of a sovereign bond (European Commission, 2010).  
Similarly to the DSA (Standardised Debt Sustainability Assessment), the main 
fundamental factors for assessing the possibility of default risk (credit risk) of a country 
are the rising government deficit and debt levels. These factors, together with the 
liquidity level of CDS and government debt markets, undermine CDS pricing. Evidently 
all these elements are interwoven, but the liquidity of the CDS market is greater 
compared to the bond cash market, precisely because CDS contracts can be used to take 
speculative or naked positions (see endnote number 4) on the basis of market’s 
perception of default risk.   
Table 3. Size of the Sovereign Credit Default Swaps (CDS) market (February 2011, in USD billion.) 
 Portugal Italy Ireland Greece  Spain Germany France 
CDS net 
notional 
7.49 26.4 3.98 5.6 17.24 16.55 18.79 
CDS net 
notional  (% of 
Government 
debt) 
3.90 1.24 2.95 1.26 2.04 1 1.11 
 
Source: Alternative Management Investment Association. 
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Considering the volumes traded in the sovereign CDS market (see Table 3), one 
can see that the notional value in the Spanish market was USD 17.24 billion, significantly 
higher than other peripheral countries in the Eurozone. Similarly, CDS contracts as a 
percentage of government debt market in Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain 
ranged from between 3.9 per cent and 1.2 per cent a low proportion compared to the 
amount of sovereign bonds issued in those countries. Nevertheless, the size of the 
Spanish CDS market is comparatively high considering both, the net notional value and 
its proportion to government debt issuance. 
In November 2012 the European Securities and Market Authority (ESMA) 
introduced a prohibition on uncovered or naked CDS transactions. The new regulation 
meant that those entering into CDS positions related to a sovereign issuer must have an 
underlying exposure to the risk of default of that sovereign issuer or of a decline in the 
value of the sovereign debt of that issuer. However, in January 2013, the CNMV  
(Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores) lifted the ban of naked short selling CDSs 
and sovereign bond transactions.  
The structure of the debt 
The presence of foreign investors (non-resident holdings of bond securities) is considered 
a relevant indicator of government debt market financialization. Existing studies 
(Andritzky, 2012) have provided evidence for the relationship between the investor base 
and yields, which suggests that an increase in the share of securities held by non-residents 
is associated with a decline in yields, but an increase in the level and volatility of yields.  
Market Makers are a group of financial companies whose ultimate purpose is to 
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stimulate the liquidity of the secondary market in government debt and co-operate with 
the Secretary of the Treasury and Financial Policy in order to diffuse government debt 
both domestically and abroad. The number of foreign market markers in the Spanish 
government debt securities market stands at 50 per cent of the total. This percentage is 
significantly high, even more considering that although the share of non-resident holdings 
has increased markedly during the last decade in all G-20 countries with the exception of 
Canada and Japan, after 2007 the trend has slowed, and even reversed in the case of the 
southern European countries (Andritzky, 2012). 
Similarly, looking at the investor base by types of instruments (Table 4) reveals 
large differences between Treasury Bills and Government Bonds. The first are issued at 
6, 12 and 18-month maturities, whereas bonds are issued at 3, 5, 10, 15 and 30 year 
maturities. The clear preference of foreign investors for short-term fixed income 
instruments, which pay all interest at maturity, shows a strategy to hedge and reduce risk 
exposure by investing in short term instruments. 
Table 4. Percentage of foreign debt holders by financial instrument, 2002-2014 
Treasury Bills 
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 
1.7 3.6 12.5 20.8 50.9 39.1 68.3 
Bonds 
42.7 43.9 44.7 47.8 42.5 36.1 39.2 
Coupons and Principals 
24.7 21.4 41.5 41.6 34.4 22.8 16.3 
 
Source: Bank of Spain 
 
Evidently, the relationship between the investor’s base and government bond 
yields would require a more in depth analysis with a longer time horizon, and the 
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inclusion of other variables such as the investor type, the role played by the European 
Central Bank in the purchase of sovereign bonds of peripheral countries, and the analysis 
of entry and exit barriers to the market. However, that analysis exceeds the objectives of 
this article. Notwithstanding, the amount of foreign sovereign debt holders can be 
considered an indicator of market’s liquidity and financialization.  
The financialization of the Spanish government’s debt market structure is linked 
to a variety of properties such as a high density of trades, a predominance of repo 
transactions, a high volume of sovereign CDS trading and a debt composition 
characterised by a high rate of non-resident debt holders and market makers. This type of 
structure has been designed to favour market liquidity, a constant concern for the Spanish 
government due to its structural deficit problems.  However, these properties can also 
worsen borrowing conditions in an economic uncertainty context, where trading 
sovereign risk offers attractive business opportunities, resulting in increased volatility and 
undermining debt sustainability.  
Public debt sustainability: public deficit and the evolution of public debt  
The significant growth in the rate of Spanish public debt from 2007 onwards has 
placed public finance sustainability at the centre of debate on European economic policy 
(Gordo et al., 2013). Public aid that was used to rescue the financial sector, the significant 
increase in public spending fuelled by high unemployment rates and, above all, falling 
government revenues due to its dependency on salary and spending taxes, taken together 
explain the debt to GDP ratio at 93.7 per cent at the end of 2013, according to the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP). This protocol is defined in European legislation (EC 
Regulation No 479/2009), and follows Maastricht Treaty guidelines, which foresaw the 
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creation of the Euro, and organized the way multilateral fiscal surveillance is conducted 
within the European Union (Eurostat, 2014). The Treaty obliges Member States to 
comply with budgetary discipline by respecting two criteria: a deficit to GDP ratio and a 
debt to GDP ratio not exceeding reference values of three per cent and 60 per cent 
respectively. These reference values are based on Government Financial Statistics (GFS) 
concepts.  Government deficit is the net lending / net borrowing of general government as 
defined in the European System of Accounts (ESA95).  Government debt is defined as 
the total consolidated gross debt at nominal value in the following categories of 
government liabilities: currency and deposits, securities other than shares excluding 
financial derivatives, and loans.  
Table 5. General government consolidated gross debt and deficit 
Gross debt % GDP Deficit 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
EU-17 68.8 78.6 84.0 86.2 89.6 91.4 92.4 -2.1 -6.2 -6.2 -4.1 -3.7 -3.0 -2.6 
Germany  65.0 72.5 81.0 78.4 79.7 77.4 74.9 -0.2 -3.2 -4.2 -1.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.3 
Ireland 42.4 61.8 86.8 109.3 120.2 120.0 107.5 -7.0 
-
13.8 
-
32.3 
-
12.5 -8.0 -5.7 -3.9 
Greece 109.4 126.7 146.2 172.0 159.4 177.0 178.6 
-
10.2 
-
15.2 
-
11.2 
-
10.2 -8.8 
-
12.4 -3.6 
Spain 39.4 52.7 60.1 69.5 85.4 93.7 99.3 -4.4 
-
11.0 -9.4 -9.5 
-
10.4 -6.9 -5.9 
France 68.1 79.0 81.7 85.2 89.6 92.3 95.6 -3.2 -7.2 -6.8 -5.1 -4.8 -4.1 -3.9 
Italy 102.3 112.5 115.3 116.4 123.2 128.8 132.3 -2.7 -5.3 -4.2 -3.5 -3.0 -2.9 -3.0 
Netherlands 54.5 56.5 59.0 61.7 66.4 67.9 68.2 0.2 -5.4 -5.0 -4.3 -3.9 -2.4 -2.4 
Portugal 71.7 83.6 96.2 111.4 126.2 129.0 130.2 -3.8 -9.8 
-
11.2 -7.4 -5.7 -4.8 -7.2 
UK 51.7 65.7 76.6 81.8 85.3 86.2 88.2 -5.1 
-
10.8 -9.7 -7.7 -8.3 -5.7 -5.7 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
In terms of total public and private debt in Spain, held in loans and securities 
other than shares, is indicative of the financial expansion produced by the growth cycle, 
which began in 1994 and lasted until 2007. During this time, the Spanish economy grew 
considerably, although very unevenly. This expansion was closely linked to a growth 
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pattern in Spain that was in turn closely connected to credit given to the real estate and 
housing sectors. 
The evolution of EDP (excessive deficit procedure) debt in government 
administrative bodies (central government, municipalities, autonomous regions and social 
security administrations), reached an unusually high peak. In the middle of 2006, public 
debt represented 38.9 per cent of GDP, well below the limit of 60 per cent set in the 
Maastricht Treaty, while in 2012 the figure stood at 85.4 per cent of the GDP. To analyze 
the reasons behind this increase, we must consider how the deficit components of public 
expenditure and revenue have evolved. Furthermore, it is also necessary to look at the 
effects of debt deficit adjustment on measures that are not reflected in the deficit but, on 
the other hand, appear in the debt, such as aid to the financial sector. 
Spain has always been well below the European average in respect of total 
government spending. According to Eurostat data, in 2007, Spanish public spending 
represented 39.2 per cent of the GDP, 6.5 percentage points below the EU-27 average; 
the end of 2007 there was  a surplus of €20.73 billion; and in 2009, there was a deficit of 
€116.37 bn.,  
While the increase in spending, from 2007 onwards, was a common trend in all 
European countries, in Spain's case there were additional features and in particular a huge 
number of job losses and rising unemployment figures, standing at an average of 6.05 
million people in 2013. This has been accompanied by increased spending on protection 
against unemployment, which in 2009 reached 3.2 per cent of the GDP, a sum of €33.04 
bn., according to Eurostat data.   
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The deterioration of public sector deficit was not exclusively due to increased 
spending, but also to falling revenue. Table 6 shows that increased spending accounted 
for 50 per cent of Spain's deficit increase, while the EU average was 87 per cent. This 
made Spain the country where increased spending least explains deficit problems, in 
contrast to Germany, where budgetary decline is mainly due to expenditure. 
Table 6. Weight of General Government Expenditure as a proportion of GDP, 2007-2009 
 
 Change in Government 
Expenditure 
2007-2009 (%) 
 
Change in the budgetary 
outcome 
2007-2009 (%) 
Weight of Government 
Expenditure in Deficit 
(%) 
UE-27 5.2 6.0 87 
Germany 3.9 3.5 111 
Italy 3.9 3.6 108 
UK 7.4 8.7 85 
Ireland 11.5 14.4 80 
France 3.8 4.8 79 
Greece 6.3 9.0 70 
Spain 6.6 13.1 50 
 
Source: Eurostat 
Similarly, of the 28 EU countries, Spain was ranked 23
rd with a total revenue of 
37.2 per cent of its GDP, 8.2 points below the European average. This placed it below 
Latvia (35.1 per cent), Bulgaria (35.0 per cent), Ireland (34.5 per cent) and Lithuania 
(32.7 per cent). In turn, Spain's total tax burden, including social security contributions, 
was only 33.3 per cent of the GDP, 7 points below the EU-28 average (40.3 per cent). It 
was ranked 20th, below Portugal and Greece. Falling revenues were particularly dramatic 
between 2007 (37.6 per cent of GDP), and 2009 (31.4 per cent), down 6.2 points, 
equivalent to €67.88 bn in just 2 years. 
Medialea (2012) claims that the inability to raise sufficient funds via taxation is 
combined with another very noticeable feature: tax collection approaches are increasingly 
regressive. That is, the tax burden falls disproportionately on those with lower incomes. 
 27 
According to official data, from 1970 to 2009, the implicit tax burden on labour income, 
including income tax and social security contributions, increased from 27 per cent to 
nearly 38 per cent in the EU However, the equivalent burden on capital income decreased 
from 38 per cent in 1980 to 30.5 per cent in 2009.  In Spain from 2000 to 2009,the tax 
burden on labour income increased by 5.4%, while capital income fell by 15.9%. 
At the same time, debt interest payments had a notable impact on expenditure in 
Spain. In 2006, interest rates accounted for 1.6 per cent of the GDP, about €9.77 billion, 
and in 2013, the figure rose to 3.4 per cent of the GDP, €34.91 billion in Spain. This 
increase of two percentage points meant that the costs of debt trebled from 2.5 per cent of 
public expenditure in 2006 to 7.6 per cent in 2013, leading to greater indebtedness and 
increased spending on paying interest on debt. 
From 2010 onwards, public debt growth was closely linked to financial aid going 
from the government to bailing-out banks, mainly savings banks. Although in 2007 
government administration debt in the form of total liabilities only represented 20 per 
cent of what is required from the Spanish economy, in 2013 it accounted for 50 per cent. 
This significant growth rate was due to a series of acts of parliament to address the crisis, 
in particular the granting of credit by the central government, financed with public debt, 
which caused a huge amount of authorized public debt and alterations in the maximum 
indebtedness limit. 
The analysis of the evolution of public debt and deficit in Spain for the period 
2007 to2013 shows the interrelation between sovereign and banking risk. Banking risk 
negatively affected sovereign risk, but it was the lack of investors’ credibility regarding 
Spanish public finances, and the economy’s growth, in a context of global aversion to 
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risk, that triggered the sovereign debt crises between 2011 and 2012. Nonetheless, the 
extent that these factors, together with structural imbalances, are able to affect the 
worsening of borrowing conditions, depends on the financialization of markets and 
financial instruments. This is explored in the next section. 
Financialization and the evolution of private debt 
In Spain private debt incurred by financial institutions, households and non-financial 
corporations, in the form of total liabilities, represented 314.9 per cent of the GDP at the 
beginning of the economic growth cycle in 1996. This had increased to 587.4 per cent in 
2006, and 569.3 per cent by the end of 2013 - a quantity three times the total value of 
goods and services produced by the Spanish economy. However, the level of 
indebtedness has been different for each group of the socio-economic actors. 
Financial institutions played a leading role in this process, which can be explained 
by the current banking model.  The banking model is mainly retail and is highly 
dependent on lending to the construction and real estate industries (Fernández-de-Lis and 
Garcia-Mora, 2008). The model is closely linked to the specifics of the Spanish economic 
growth pattern, being heavily focused on the property sector and highly reliant on 
external funding. 
According to the Bank of Spain, banking credit to the private sector exceeded 210 
per cent of Spanish GDP at various points of 2009 and 2010, and then decreased. It was 
still at a very high level, exceeding 180 per cent of the GDP in 2014. Moreover, this 
situation contrasts with fifteen years ago, when this ratio stood at 130 per cent of the 
GDP (Calvo and Paul, 2012). Credit expansion in the private sector followed a similar 
pattern to other countries that also experienced housing booms, such as Ireland or the 
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U.S. (Garrote et al., 2013). In Ireland, between 2002 and 2009, private debt to GDP ratio 
increased by 165 percentage points, reaching 330 per cent of its GDP. In Spain, the 
increase was also very noticeable, debt went up 75 percentage points, reaching 214 per 
cent of its GDP, between 2002 and 2009. Although debt in the United Kingdom and 
United States grew more slowly, UK debt still reached a level similar to Spain's (although 
starting from a higher point). In all four countries, there was a noticeable increase in 
household debt, mainly to finance house purchases. In the cases of Ireland and Spain, 
there was an additional source of vulnerability, associated with the debt of corporations 
linked to the real estate sector. 
A deleveraging process in the private sector, especially households and non-
financial corporations, began in 2009. This was largely due to a decline in activity and to 
difficulties in obtaining finance, especially for small and medium businesses. Regarding 
households, mortgages were the main component of the debt which in 2010 represented 
64.9 per cent of the GDP, as shown in Table 7. This percentage was relatively high in 
comparison  to this ratio in Italy or France, but lower than in the USA, UK or Holland, 
where the rate was 107 per cent. 
Table 7. Total Outstanding Residential Loans, 2010 and 2012 
 
 Total outstanding Residential 
Loans.  
Total amount, € million 
Total outstanding Residential 
Loans to GDP Ratio 
 2010 2012 2010 2012 
 
USA 8,430,100 8,173,336 77.7 68.0 
UK 1,440,258 1,550,903 83.4 81.0 
Germany 1,152,195 1,184,853 46.2 44.8 
France 796,600 874,000 41.1 43.0 
Spain 680,208 641,510 64.9 61.0 
Netherlands 631,047 651,200 107.2 108.4 
Italy 352,111 365,588 22.7 23.3 
Sweden 292,263 334,922 78.5 80.7 
Denmark 237,252 246,415 100.5 100.8 
EU27 6,423,278 6,727,870 52.1 52.0 
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Source: European Mortgage Federation 
 
 
The link between the debt of financial institutions and government debt comes 
mainly through two channels: so-called recapitalization measures, which accounted for 
26 per cent of total aid between 2009 and May 2013 and liquidity measures which 
accounted for the rest. Regarding recapitalization measures, some €63.55 billion has been 
injected into the financial system by the state since 2009. €41.27 billion of this amount 
was supplied using the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), created to facilitate 
financial support for countries in the Euro zone.  
This included instruments such as Asset Protection Schemes (APS), which are 
guarantees that provide financial entities with insurance against risks acquired from other 
entities, with potential losses in their loan portfolios. Another measure is to purchase 
toxic assets using the Deposit Guarantee Fund (DGF) and the SAREB, popularly known 
as the ‘bad bank’.  Further measures include debt guarantees to promissory notes, bonds 
and subordinated debt; and, finally, preferred shares or convertible preferred bonds 
subscribed by the Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring (FROB). 
 Both have had a direct or indirect impact on public debt, but also on the public 
sector deficit. This has been mainly due to the debt interest and financial costs related to 
the European loan (from the ECB). 
According to the CNMV (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores, 2012), 
financial aid for banks, the so called ‘anti-crisis measures’, absorbed 94.5 per cent of the 
total aid received by Spain in 2011. This accounted for 7.8 per cent of GDP, which in per 
capita terms amounted to €1,781 for each person in Spain. The estimate of total aid 
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received and its impact on public debt is not easy to calculate. This is because its 
quantification depends on each instrument, and mainly because the huge amounts behind 
the rescue would be difficult to explain by the political and financial elites. However, 
according to the Bank of Spain Economic Bulletin (2013), the effects of aid to the 
financial sector were responsible for a 22.8 per cent increase in EDP (excessive deficit 
procedure) public debt between 2008 and 2012.  Financing requirements due to falling 
revenues and increased government spending account for 71.1 per cent of this variation, 
while the effect of the GDP variation accounts for six per cent. 
In addition, implicit guarantees to citizen deposits under €100,000, backed by the 
Deposit Guarantee Fund (DGF) must be added. At the end of 2012, this covered deposits 
of financial institutions which amounted to the sum of €795.13 billion. According to 
Sanchez Mato (2013), this amount should be counted as debt, given the fact it is 
guaranteed by the state and also due to the financial insufficiencies of the DGF (Deposit 
Guarantee Fund). 
Paradoxically, relief measures to the financial sector tried to resolve this situation 
of insolvency at the cost of plunging public administrations into a sovereign debt crisis. A 
crisis prompted by the economic actors' loss of confidence in the solvency of the Member 
States (Sweedberg, 2011). This is even more paradoxical when we consider that the 
creditors of the public debt are mostly domestic financial institutions. As Stiglitz says, ‘if 
the Spanish government bails out the banks and banking rescues the government, the 
system becomes a voodoo economy’ (Expansion, 11/06/2012). 
 
Conclusions 
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This article has analysed the relationship between indebtedness, debt sustainability and 
financialization. The concept of indebtedness has to do with the debtor’s capacity to 
return future payments back to creditors. Debt sustainability can be considered a 
dimension of indebtedness because it is connected to a ‘country’s capacity to finance its 
policy agenda and service the ensuing debt without unduly large adjustments’ (IMF, 
2013: 147).  
   This article shows that there is not a simple relationship between these concepts. 
In the case of Spain, financialization of the government debt market is associated with a 
debt market structure, characterised by a high density and value of executed trades, a 
significant importance of short selling and a relevant presence of debt holding foreign 
investors. Government debt market financialization is linked to the institutional 
arrangements aiming to provide liquidity to the market.  At the same time, these 
institutional structures enable investors to trade risk on the basis of their expectations and 
perceptions on debt sustainability. 
This model of financialization can undermine debt sustainability by increasing 
borrowing costs and therefore altering the social justice principles on which European 
democracies are based. Exceeding debt limits and budget deficits set by Maastricht have 
impeded government debt capacity to meet other basic needs such as education, health 
and pensions. 
Government debt market structure is a fundamental element in explaining self-
fulfilling dynamics, by which, the only increase in the interest rates of the government’s 
debt is produced by investors’ fear of non-sustainability. This is enough, in turn, to make 
non-sustainability possible. The role played by institutional arrangements in order to 
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explain the sovereign debt crisis which existed in Spain between 2011-2012 is 
complementary to those explanations based on psychological behaviour of investors who 
simply act following the markets’ trends when information is asymmetric (Kindleberger 
and Aliber, 2005).  
At the same time, this article shows the importance of structural deficit problems 
that affect public spending and revenues. The effects of the banking bail out on public 
deficit and debt can account for the increase in the public debt to GDP ratio, but these 
factors alone cannot explain successfully how the public debt spreads between 2011-
2012.  The financialization of government market structure is argued here to explain the 
worsening of sustainable borrowing by allowing intense trading of risk on the 
performance of sovereign debt securities. 
Regarding private debt, this article shows that the growing financialization of the 
Spanish economy is closely linked to the private sector's credit expansion model. This 
economic growth model and the consequent pattern of private indebtedness led to the 
1996 and 2007 property bubbles and placed the Spanish mortgage debt market among the 
largest in Europe. Private indebtedness has been mainly led by financial institutions 
which in Spain, are very much specialized in the bank loan markets, particularly home 
mortgages.  Public resources used to clean up the financial system, mainly given to the 
savings bank sector, constituted one of the fundamental causes of the rapid growth of 
public debt and the consequent financial burdens. The interrelation of banking and 
sovereign risks makes the importance of recognising the political and institutional 
dimensions of credibility and debt sustainability assessments visible.  
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The limitations of available statistics (Hardie, 2011; Andritzky, 2012), to analyse 
financialization suggest that further comparative research is needed, combining 
quantitative and qualitative approaches. Nevertheless some theoretical conclusions are 
needed in order to understand the role played by shaping policy-making institutions when 
it comes to explain the expansion of the financial system.  This article points out, 
following Hardie (2011) and MacKenzie (2009), that together with analysing the impact 
of this broad process of change referring to globalization, deregulation and financial 
innovation, it is important to focus research on the specifics of market structures. This 
may avoid considering financial systems as neutral and anonymous structures, and 
refocus scholarly attention on institutional structures 
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i The Spread is the difference between the yield on a country's bond issue and the yield on a comparable 
bond, issued by a benchmark, that in Europe is a 10-year German bond. 
ii To see an in depth analysis of the process of financialization of the Spanish economy, see Massó and 
Yruela, 2016. 
iii Short selling is the sale of a security that is not owned by the seller, or that the seller has borrowed. Short 
selling is motivated by the belief that a security's price will decline, enabling it to be bought back at a lower 
price to make a profit. Short selling may be prompted by speculation, or by the desire to hedge the 
downside risk of a long position in the same security or a related one. 
iv The general government sector comprises the subsectors: central government, state government, local 
government and social security funds. 
v Investors can buy and sell protection (CDS) without owning the debt insured by the CDS instrument. This 
position is called “naked CDS”. It allows taking speculative positions without being exposed to the 
underlying credit risk in the bond cash market.  
